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Abstract
This paper investigates the diﬀerences in the matching process of
job seekers and vacancies to be ﬁlled between diﬀerent educational and
occupational groups. To investigate this issue, matching functions are
estimated across diﬀerent occupations and educational cohorts, that
is, on an even lower level of aggregation than previously investigated
in the literature, and along diﬀerent dimensions. In order to rule out
spurious results, the panel data are tested for stationarity applying
novel panel testing techniques based on bootstrapping methods. The
data used also allow to distinguish inﬂows into jobs by previous job
status of new hires.
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Labor market research has made extensive use of the concept of a match-
ing function in recent years. In particular, the matching function appears
as a shortcut to introduce frictions on the labor market in models investi-
gating equilibrium unemployment. However, surprisingly enough, the bulk
of research to date was theoretical. Moreover, the small existing literature
investigating the empirical relevance of the concept rarely goes beyond the
aggregate level. Consequently, the matching function is rarely used as an
empirical concept to ﬁnd out more about the structure of labor markets,
in particular at less aggregate levels, which would allow to compare the
outcomes on diﬀerent labor markets. This paper will argue that empirical
matching functions can serve as a helpful instrument to get more informa-
tion about the functioning of labor markets, in particular on disaggregate
levels.
Most of the empirical literature on matching functions supports the rele-
vance of the concept also in the data. However, little is known about sectoral
or occupational diﬀerences with respect to matching and job creation and
the closely related questions about labor market eﬃciency, relative supply
shortages of speciﬁc skills and the like, issues which are particularly relevant
questions for individuals when planning their career as well as for politi-
cians in designing labor market or migration policies. This paper is a ﬁrst
attempt to use the concept of a matching function to ﬁnd out more about
the structure of labor markets and thus to ﬁll this gap.
The ﬁndings suggest that the relation between new hirings and stocks
of job seekers and vacancies described by the matching function is indeed
empirically relevant. The presumption of constant returns to scale of the
aggregate matching function is not conﬁrmed by the data. Not surpris-
ingly, the ﬁndings for disaggregate matching functions diﬀer substantially
from aggregate results. Labor markets for diﬀerent occupations seem to ex-
hibit fundamentally diﬀerent structures concerning the creation of new jobs.
These diﬀerences are even more pronounced once labor markets are deﬁned
by diﬀerent educational attainment instead of occupation. While some mar-
kets exhibit constant returns to scale, others are characterized by increasing
or decreasing returns to scale. All in all, the results obtained from looking
at disaggregate levels provide a very detailed picture of the functioning of
labor markets. In particular with respect to policy advice, the approach fol-
lowed in this paper is therefore superior to previous evaluations of empirical
matching functions.
The following section brieﬂy presents the theoretical concept of a match-
ing function and surveys some related literature. Section 3 presents the em-
pirical strategy followed in this paper and discusses some econometric issues
of importance, in particular the procedure used to test for stationarity of
the panels used. Section 4 contains a detailed description of the data used
1in the empirical investigation and addresses interesting features of the data.
In section 5 we present results of estimations of aggregate matching func-
tions. Section 6 studies data disaggregated by occupations. Eventually, in
section 7 we investigate matching functions for diﬀerent levels of educational
attainment. Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical Matching Functions
Most of the research dealing with matching functions to date was theoret-
ical. This section introduces the economic rationale behind the concept
of a matching function and surveys some recent contributions attempting
to evaluate the empirical content of the matching function, especially on
disaggregate levels.
The matching function is essentially a short-cut to introduce frictions
and therefore to generate unemployment in models of the labor market. In
a nutshell, because of imperfect information, trading frictions etc., matches
m between workers looking for a job and ﬁrms looking for somebody to
ﬁll their vacancies do not arise instantaneously, but involve time consuming
searching and ﬁnding of appropriate matches on both sides.1 The larger the
pool of people actively searching for employment, U, and the more posted
available job vacancies, V , ﬁrms try to ﬁll, the more matches are generated.2
Essentially the matching function acts like a production function for new
hires:
m = m(U,V )( 1 )
with ∂m/∂U > 0, ∂m/∂V > 0, and m(0,V)=m(U,0) = 0. The precise
formal representation is ﬂexible and depends on the problem one wants to
tackle, but the vast majority of theoretical contributions involving a match-
ing function assumes decreasing marginal returns and constant returns to
scale.3 The latter assumption is needed as to obtain a stationary unemploy-
ment rate (cf. Pissarides, 2000). This assumption is a hotly debated issue in
the empirical literature. For example, Blanchard and Diamond (1989) ﬁnd
constant or slightly increasing returns to scale using aggregate US data.
Broersma and Van Ours (1999) argue that the results for the returns to
1See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and the references therein for microfoundations
of the matching function.
2There are also alternative speciﬁcations of matching functions other than the de-
pendence of matchings on stocks of job-seekers and vacancies. Coles and Smith (1998)
suggest a stock-ﬂow approach according to which the stock on one side of the market is
only matched to new inﬂows on the other side.
3Exceptions exist, see e.g. Armengol-Calvo and Zenou (2001) who provide a micro-
foundation for an aggregate matching function which does not exhibit constant returns
to scale. See also Storer (1994), Warren (1996) and Yashiv (2000) for empirical studies
allowing for ﬂexible functional forms of the matching function.
2scale depend heavily on the data for active job seekers and posted vacan-
cies used and emphasize the importance of looking at comparable measures
for ﬂows and explanatory stocks. For example, they show theoretically as
well as empirically that the results for returns to scale are upward biased
if only ﬂows from unemployment to employment rather than all ﬂows to
employment are considered while using the same explanatory variables. See
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an extensive overview of the empirical
results on the question of constant returns.
In what follows, we retain the Cobb-Douglas representation of the match-
ing function that is predominant in the empirical literature. Denote mt as
the total new hires at period t, or more precisely between t − 1a n dt, then




with α and β being the elasticities of matchings with respect to job seekers
and posted vacancies, respectively, and A being a scale parameter capturing
the overall eﬃciency of the matching process. Constant returns to scale
implies α + β =1 .
Empirically, the matching function can be estimated exploiting cross
sectional variation across i entities of interest (like regions, industries or
occupations) and time variation t. It is usually speciﬁed as a linear model
containing a constant CONS, a time trend T and possibly other controls
Z:
lnmit = CONS + αlnUit + β lnVit + γ lnZit + ζT +  it (3)
Due to the Cobb-Douglas formulation, the time trend and other controls
like occupation, age and education group dummies enter the matching pro-
cess in the form of augmenting ’total matching productivity’. Due to the
log-linear form of the estimation equation, positive coeﬃcients can therefore
be interpreted as an additional increase in the eﬃciency of the labor market
with respect to forming new matches stemming from the respective variable.
The opposite is true for negative coeﬃcients.
The relative sizes of the elasticities of the matching function with respect
to the stock of unemployed and vacancies indicate the relative importance
of labor supply and labor demand in the matching process.4 For example,
in a labor market characterized by a small β but a large α, an additional
vacancy creates nearly no new hirings, while an additional job seeker leads
to a new match with a high probability. In other words, there prevails
a relative supply shortage on this labor market. The interpretation of a
relative demand shortage is analogous.
4Formally, they are equivalent to the matching shares of the respective inputs in the
matching process, similar to the income shares in an ordinary Cobb-Douglas production
function.
3In general, the empirical literature on aggregate matching functions, be-
ginning with Pissarides (1979, 1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989),
and recently Yashiv (2000) (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for an ex-
tensive survey), points at the empirical relevance of the concept and the
strong implications of the labor market structure on the dynamic behavior
of the economy.
There have been several attempts to empirically analyze matching func-
tions on disaggregate levels. Blanchard and Diamond (1990) use U.S. data
to estimate an aggregate matching function and a matching function for the
manufacturing sector, and they ﬁnd diﬀerences in the parameters estimated,
shorter vacancy duration than for the economy as a whole and higher returns
to scale. Van Ours and Ridder (1995) test for job competition between dif-
ferent skill groups and conclude that there seems to be competition for new
hires among high skilled while there is no evidence for job competition at
lower levels of education. Recent contributions like Coles and Smith (1996),
Anderson and Burgess (2000), and Burgess and Proﬁt (2001) have found
similar results by using cross sectional data on regional levels compared to
those stemming from aggregate time series. However, the results vary for
diﬀerent concepts of pools of searchers, and exhibit some regional spillovers.
The analysis of Broersma and Van Ours (1999) who use an industry panel on
the 1-digit level for the Netherlands, suggests some variation in the structure
of labor markets of diﬀerent industries.
For German data, aggregate matching functions have been estimated
frequently, examples are Buttler and Cramer (1991), Entorf (1998) and ref-
erences therein. However, with the exception of Entorf, disaggregate evi-
dence, in particular, on the occupational level is scarce. Among other issues
to be discussed next, one main contribution of this paper is to ﬁll this gap
in the literature.
3 Empirical Strategy and Econometric Issues
This section presents the empirical strategy followed in the remainder of the
paper. Several conceptual and empirical problems deserve special attention
and are therefore discussed brieﬂy. A particularly important issue is that
of spurious regression results if the data used are non-stationary. However,
testing short panels for stationarity is rarely done in the respective literature.
Therefore, the test strategy pursued in the empirical part is explained in
some detail below.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
The primary aim of this paper is to deliver some comparable results on
labor market structure across occupations and educational cohorts, that
is, on an even lower level of aggregation than previously investigated in
4the literature, and along diﬀerent dimensions. The lack of disaggregate
evidence lamented by Hall (1989) has to do with the diﬃculties of obtaining
appropriate data on disaggregated levels. Transferring the concept of a
matching function to lower levels of aggregation aggravates problems with
respect to the availability of appropriate data at appropriate frequencies
which are already present at the aggregate levels. These problems aggravate
once one starts looking at industry, regional, occupational or educational
levels. Our main interest lies in the time invariant fundamental modes of
functioning of the labor markets and their structural diﬀerences. Therefore,
losing quite a lot of the dynamics as the frequency of the data used is annual
has to be taken into account. However, the data used are longitudinal,
so that intertemporal and cross sectional variation can be exploited. The
investigations undertaken below should therefore be seen in a long term
context. The data used are exceptionally rich and do not suﬀer from many
data problems usually encountered in empirical studies on the matching
function. In our view, this compensates weaknesses in the dynamics of the
data, and justiﬁes their use.
In particular, the data allow for disaggregation along occupations and
levels of educational attainment, which are the relevant dimensions for ana-
lyzing diﬀerent labor markets, rather than disaggregating along industries.
Separating labor markets by occupation or education allows looking at the
relevant comparable measures for ﬂows and stocks, comparing ”apples with
apples”. Separating by industries or regions blurs the frictional diﬀerences
of labor markets arising from diﬀerences in qualiﬁcatory demands or in
search intensity, screening problems etc. underlying the idea of matching
functions, because industries or regions typically employ all sorts of occupa-
tions (albeit with potentially varying weights). Deﬁning labor markets by
occupations takes the structure of demand and supply and the diﬀerences
in e.g. skill requirements and matching quality for certain jobs better into
account. Moreover, switching industries within the same occupation might
catch other eﬀects than those interesting from the perspective of labor mar-
ket structure as faced by policy makers deciding about training measures,
immigration policies and the like.
With respect to the level of disaggregation, the paper is closest to the
contribution by Entorf (1998) who uses panel data of yearly frequency for 40
occupational groups for the period 1971-1992. However, Entorf uses place-
ments by the employment agency as dependent variable and concentrates
on the dynamics without analyzing diﬀerences across occupations. Also
Berman (1997) is able to group his data into seven occupation-industry
groups which are classiﬁed by the Employment Agency and mutually exclu-
sive. His ﬁndings vary considerably across groups and lead him to conclude
that there is strong evidence of heterogeneity across, but also within groups.
Van Ours and Ridder (1995) estimate matching functions for three diﬀer-
ent educational-occupational groups and ﬁnd diﬀerences in competition and
5crowding out for the respective groups.
In every stage of the empirical analysis, we follow an identical plan:
First, we present descriptive results and interesting features of the data
described in the next section. In particular, because of the richness of the
data it is possible to distinguish ﬂows to employment, that is new matches,
by their sources and for diﬀerent dimensions of disaggregation. Then, we
estimate diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the benchmark matching equation (3).
We also present results for regressing various measures of matches on stocks
of unemployed and vacancies for reasons to be discussed next.
3.2 Conceptual and Econometric Issues
The empirical analysis of standard matching functions on disaggregate lev-
els implies some conceptual and econometric problems which have to be
addressed brieﬂy.
Recent contributions also addressed the problem of biases in the pa-
rameters of interest due to misspeciﬁed empirical matching functions.I n
particular, Broersma and Van Ours (1999) and Mumford and Smith (1999)
emphasize the importance of estimating ﬂows with the correct corresponding
stocks, which are unobservable in the case of employed job seekers. Mum-
ford and Smith, as well as Anderson and Burgess (2000) ﬁnd evidence for
signiﬁcant job competition between employed and unemployed job seekers
and crowding out eﬀects.
The data used in this study allow for estimations of matching functions
for diﬀerent measures of m and hence to replicate previous studies. There-
fore we adopt the following notation in what follows. All hirings within a
given period and a given deﬁnition of a labor market are denoted by mall.
New matches consisting of formerly employed (without a spell of unemploy-
ment between two employment relationships) read mE. Likewise, let new
matches from unemployment be written as mU, and matches from outside
the labor force mOL. Taken together, new hirings from unemployment and
from outside the labor force are deﬁned as hirings from non-employment:
mU + mOL = mX.5 Finally, new matches from registered vacancies, as
measured by successful placements by employment agencies, are denoted as
mR. Moreover, the data allow disaggregation of diﬀerent measures of active
job seekers. A novelty of the paper is that matching functions of the form
of equation (3) with diﬀerent measures of ﬂows, like mall, mX or mU as
dependent variable can be estimated using the same data set.
We are aware of problems in the interpretation of the results result-
ing from job market competition between employed and unemployed and
unobservable endogenous search behavior on both sides as was suggested by
Anderson and Burgess (2000) and discussed in a companion paper (Fahr and
5From this discussion it should also be clear that mX = mall − mE.
6Sunde, 2001a).6 In this regard, we estimate several alternative speciﬁcations
that try to regress ﬂows of new hires on the correct corresponding stocks
as explanatory variables. Therefore, in addition to the standard speciﬁca-
tion with all hirings as dependent variable, we present results estimations
for hirings from non-employment and from unemployment to employment
using unemployed job seekers as an explanatory variable, which can all be
identiﬁed thanks to the richness of the data.
Disaggregation aggravates the problem of time aggregation because, as
already mentioned before, the use of disaggregate data usually implies that
the data exhibit lower frequencies than would be desirable.7 The problem
with low frequencies as the yearly data used in this study is that relevant
changes in ﬂows and stocks are misrecorded or simply not recorded: E.g.
multiple matches of identical individuals leading to separations after a short
employment spell show up in the ﬂows but not in the stock of unemployed
(see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). In order to deal with this problem,
stocks have been instrumented (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1990, Berman,
1997), or the conventional matching concept has been extended along the
lines of the stock-ﬂow appoach in order to keep track of ﬂows aﬀecting the
stocks within the observation period (e.g. Gregg and Petrongolo, 1997).
As most of the disaggregated literature, we largely ignore these problems.
However, in the appendix we describe an attempt to construct stock data
that also take into account information on inﬂows to unemployment and
vacancies within a year. Estimation results using these data serve as a
robustness check.
A related problem is the simultaneity bias resulting from the use of
stocks as explanatory variables which are themselves depleted by matches
during the period of observation, the dependent variable. A straightforward
solution to this problem is to use stocks that are measured at (or before)
the beginning of the observation period of the ﬂows. This is done in the
empirical analysis.
From the preceding discussion it becomes clear that the main concep-
tual diﬃculty of empirical matching functions is to use the correct measures
of matches as dependent variable and the correct corresponding stocks as
explanatory variables. But besides the issues of time aggregation and simul-
taneity, one could also argue that the real challenge for empirical research
is to only use those job seekers and vacancies that are actually at risk for
being matched.8 For example, not all registered unemployed (or vacancies)
actually face a positive probability of being matched for various reasons, like
lack of interest in ﬁnding employment, stigmatization eﬀects etc. Therefore,
6See Pissarides (1994, 2000) for a theoretical model of on-the-job-search and endoge-
nously determined search intensity.
7Already Blanchard and Diamond (1989) argue that the concept of a matching function
would ideally require high frequency data as it is speciﬁed in continuous time.
8We are grateful to Melvyn Coles for bringing this point to our attention.
7the usual measures of the relevant stocks imply a problem of measurement
error leading to downward bias in the coeﬃcient estimates: these stocks
are merely a proxy of the correct relevant stocks of interest (those at risk).
There is some evidence for considerable (unobserved) heterogeneity within
the pools of job seekers and vacancies that aﬀects the individual chances of
being matched successfully (see Berman, 1997, Coles and Smith, 1998, and
the debate on negative duration dependence). This has been interpreted
as support for the validity of the stock-ﬂow approach, because new inﬂows
to these pools exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher probability of being matched
within a certain period. Thus, new inﬂows might be a better proxy for
market participants at risk to ﬁnd a match. Unfortunately, our data do not
allow to identify new inﬂows into the pools on the levels of disaggregation
necessary.
3.3 Testing for Spurious Matching Functions
The use of disaggregated data provides richer information due to additional
variation across cross sectional units and allows to apply panel estimation
techniques. However, there is still the danger of spurious regression results
if the data are non-stationary. If both dependent variable and explanatory
variables are non-stationary, estimation results might suggest a causal link
which is just an artifact of the data. In this case, conventional critical val-
ues for t-statistics lead to misinterpretation since appropriate critical values
would have to exceed the conventional ones.
Standard unit root tests to detect non-stationarities have low power in
short time series. Testing for stationarity and unit roots in panel data is
currently a ﬁeld of intensive research (see Banerjee, 1999, Maddala and
Wu, 1999 and Baltagi, 2000, for extensive surveys on the existing litera-
ture). In the empirical literature on matching functions, the problem of
potentially spurious results on disaggregate levels has been largely ignored.
A notable exception is Entorf (1998) who uses similar data like the data
used in this paper.9 He attaches considerable importance to the question
whether estimates of aggregate matching functions could possibly be spuri-
ous, and indeed ﬁnds some evidence supporting this view. Citing evidence
that builds on panel unit root tests he concludes that unit roots in his panel
of occupational groups are unlikely.
In order to test for the possibility of spurious results, what is of interest is
whether the data are stationary or not. The empirical analysis below tackles
two new aspects in this respect. First, instead of testing a null of a unit root
9Entorf uses data from the same sources and for an almost identical period (1971-
1992), but less detailed than those used in this study. For instance, he distinguishes
only 40 occupational groups, while we have data on 83 occupations from 1980 to 1995.
Moreover, while he uses data on placements as measure for hires, we use the arguably
more appropriate social security notiﬁcations to identify matches.
8in the panel data, we employ a panel test with the null of stationarity against
the alternative of a unit root, proposed by Hadri (2000). The null implies
that all tested series in the panel are stationary and is rejected if any one of
the series has a unit root. A rejection therefore does not necessarily mean
that the entire panel has a unit root. Testing for stationarity in the present
context is therefore more informative than testing the panel for unit roots.10
Second, since the panels we use have a short time series dimension (16
observations), we cannot necessarily hope that asymptotic properties hold.
Therefore, we use bootstrapping methods along the lines of Li and Maddala
(1996) in order to obtain the empirical distributions of the test statistics and
make inference.11 The precise procedure is described in appendix B. In this
context, testing for stationarity has the additional advantage over testing for
unit roots that one has to make assumptions in order to construct bootstrap
samples that are a lot less restrictive, since under a null of a unit root one
would have to specify the precise time structure that is valid under the null.
4D a t a
The data used for the analysis below are yearly data on unemployment,
vacancies, employment levels and ﬂows from registered vacancies to employ-
ment for Western Germany. The data are from oﬃcial labor statistics and
disaggregated at the occupational level. Occupations are deﬁned by notiﬁ-
cations by the current employer about the current activity or job and are
part of an individual’s social security record.12
Moreover, contrary to virtually all data sets used in the literature (e.g.
Anderson and Burgess, 2000) also data on the pools of job seekers and va-
cancies are disaggregated.13 In contrast to the help-wanted index frequently
used in U.S. studies, the vacancy measure provides detailed information
about all vacancies registered at local employment oﬃces. The data where
originally disaggregated by 83 occupational groups. For all estimations, the
occupational group collecting all unspeciﬁed occupations, trainees and ap-
10In this case one would have to consider a null of unit roots in all series against sta-
tionarity in any one of the series. This might be a more conservative test in the present
context, but a rejection would not indicate whether the entire panel is stationary and
therefore be of little informational content.
11See also Maddala and Wu (1999) and Chang (2000) for contributions applying the
boostrap to panel tests for unit roots. Yin and Wu (2000) propose a test for stationarity
for panel data based on bootstrapped data which pools tests of the individual time series
in the panel. In contrast, the methodology presented below obtains test statistics for the
entire panel.
12For unemployed individuals or individuals out of the labor force, occupation is deﬁned
by the notiﬁcation of their last employer about their last job.
13This is true for the main focus of disaggregation in this paper, the disaggregation by
occupation
9prentices (group 98) is dropped, which leaves us with 82 occupational groups
throughout the empirical analysis.14 In the deﬁnition of relevant aggrega-
tion levels of labor markets, there is a trade-oﬀ between disaggregating as
much as possible on the one hand and representing labor markets as homoge-
nous entities on the other hand.15 Therefore, observations were clustered
in nine broad occupational groups.16 The groups were purely constructed
on economic grounds. In particular, the criterion for the grouping was the
proximity and relatedness of occupations with respect to skill requirements
and the activities usually performed. The hirings are measured on the in-
dividual level and stem from an anonymized representative 1% sample of
German social security records. The data are available for the years 1975-
1995. The database is supplemented by data on unemployment beneﬁts
recipients and by establishment information (see Bender et al. (2000) for
details.) Because there is some measurement error in the data before 1980
and to keep the data comparable to the aggregate data from labor statistics,
the observations from 1980 to 1995 are retained for the empirical analysis.
The individual data include a ﬁrm identiﬁer and information on the
employment status. All in all, the data allow to identify hirings from one
year to another for each occupation by source of hiring. Speciﬁcally, hirings
from out of the labor force, from unemployment, and from employment can
be distinguished.17
There is, however, a shortcoming in the data regarding the distinction
of hirings from unemployment and hirings from out of the labor force. Due
to measurement error in the data, our measure of hirings from out of the
labor force in fact measures hirings from out of the labor force as well as
hirings from unemployment (see data appendix for details). On the other
hand, our measure of hirings from unemployment underestimates the true
number of hirings from unemployment. Nevertheless we could clearly mea-
sure total hirings, ﬂows from employment to employment and hirings from
non-employment. Despite the measurement problems with our measure of
hirings from unemployment, we present results for mU along results for ﬂows
from non-employment mX, because our measure of mU serves as a better
proxy for the true number of hirings from unemployment than comparable
data used in the literature. The precise identiﬁcation from the sources of
ﬂows to employment is important because, as already found by Broersma
14On average over the entire observation period, the members of group 98 make up for
about 0.17 percent of total employment. The eﬀect of dropping this group is therefore
negligible.
15In particular, it is desirable to design occupational groups so as to represent labor
markets in order to capture miscodings and to treat changes between germane occupations
as within-group events.
16The data appendix provides a detailed description of the data used in the analysis
including a list of occupational groups.
17However, due to use of social security data, holders of jobs which are exempt from
social security payments are not recorded as employed.
10and van Ours (1999) and Mumford and Smith (1999), estimates of matching
functions vary considerably with the respective ﬂows considered. However,
the data are even richer than theirs in that they allow disaggregation to
lower levels and along several dimensions. The central focus of disaggrega-
tion is on the occupational level. The data also allow to disaggregate ﬂows
to employment in total and by sources along other relevant dimensions like
age and education. The richness of the data thereby allow to investigate all
sources of ﬂows to employment by three age groups and three educational
levels, which is another innovation in the context of empirical matching.18
One problem of the data is that unemployment and vacancy rates are
reported for certain reference dates only while the ﬂows to employment are
calculated for a given period, in the data set one year. In order to capture
the relevant stocks better in this respect, some attempts have been made to
create data that come closer to the theoretically desirable measures.19
5Aggregate Matching
This section summarizes the results from estimations of diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of the matching function as speciﬁed in equation (3) using data aggre-
gated up from 82 occupational groups for the period 1980 to 1995. These
results are of particular interest since the literature on empirical matching
functions is based almost exclusively on aggregate time series data although
at much higher frequencies. The section discusses the benchmark results
and diﬀerent time structures and presents estimates of matching function
for diﬀerent measures of ﬂows.
5.1 General Results
Descriptive statistics of the data are listed in Table 5-1. It is striking that
the vacancy rate is so much smaller than the unemployment rate. This has
to do with the fact that both measures are collected for reference dates,
but that the average duration of a vacancy is a lot shorter than that of an
unemployment spell. It is interesting to note that more than two thirds
of all new hirings aﬀect individuals who are not employed.20 The numbers
18Information on the education attainment is reported by the employer and might there-
fore contain some measurement error. This should be taken into account when interpreting
the results.
19Details on how these adjusted stocks are constructed are described in the Data Ap-
pendix.
20The numbers are roughly in line with those mentioned in the literature: Blanchard
and Diamond (1989) conclude that in their U.S. data, mE are about 15 percent of total
matches while mU and mOL make up for 45 and 40 percent, respectively. According to
Burda and Wyplosz (1994), German data reveal 16, 42 and 42 percent for mE, mU and
mOL.
11obtained for hirings from unemployment and out of the labor force by dis-
aggregating further reveal surprisingly high ﬂows from out of the labor force
and surprisingly low ﬂows from unemployment. However this has to do with
the coding of the data mentioned before, so these numbers have to be taken
with a big grain of salt. Flows from non-employment seem to be a lot more
reliable and the analysis below will thus concentrate on those. Flows from
registered vacancies make almost 60 percent of total ﬂows and are measured
as successful placements by the employment agencies. The main problem
with these ﬂows is that according to oﬃcial statistics up to 20 percent of
successful placements result in employment relations that end within less
than 8 days (see ANBA, 1997). Therefore, also results obtained using this
ﬂow have to be interpreted with care.
[ Insert Table 5-1 about here. ]
Table 5-2 presents results from estimating several speciﬁcations of a stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas matching function of the form of equation (3).21 The
baseline speciﬁcation (1) contains a linear time trend. Speciﬁcation (2) ad-
ditionally includes dummies for broad occupational groups. In both cases,
the hypothesis of constant returns to scale can be rejected at the 1%-level.
The stock of unemployed job seekers has a slightly higher weight in the
creation of total new matches than the stock of registered vacancies. The
linear time trend has a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient indicating an increase
in the frictions on the labor market over time. This pattern is virtually
unchanged qualitatively as well as quantitatively once time dummies are
introduced instead of a linear time trend (speciﬁcation 3), and when dum-
mies for 9 broad occupational groups are added (speciﬁcation 4). However,
while the coeﬃcients for all time dummies are consistently negative, they
become highly signiﬁcant only after 1985, and their absolute value increases
over time. This indicates a deterioration in the eﬃciency of the functioning
of the labor market over time, equivalent to an outward shift of the Bev-
eridge Curve. The ﬁnding of negative time eﬀects is consistent with what is
found in the literature, typically starting with the early 1960s (see Pissarides
and Petrongolo, 2001, for a survey.) Controlling for GDP (model 5), GDP
growth (model 6), and both (model 7) leaves the results virtually unchanged
21The results are obtained by pooling the data from 82 occupations, resulting in 16 ×
82 = 1312 observations. In contrast, Entorf (1998) aggregates the data before estimating
which leaves him with only 22 observations.
12while the coeﬃcients for the controls are not signiﬁcant.22,23
As was mentioned previously, in order to rule out the possibility of spu-
rious results, we test the aggregate data for stationarity using the panel test
suggested by Hadri (2000). For inference, we apply the bootstrap method
described in appendix B. It turns out that we can neiter reject the null of
level stationarity for all matches, nor the null of stationarity when a trend
is included.24
[ Insert Table 5-2 about here. ]
The results obtained using panel data ﬁt in the broad picture obtained
by numerous studies of empirical matching functions obtained with aggre-
gate time series data (see Broersma and Van Ours (1999) for an overview.)
One striking diﬀerence to most previous results is that the matching elas-
ticity with respect to unemployment is consistently higher than that for
vacancies. One has to bear in mind, however, that the matching function
estimated might be misspeciﬁed in the sense that the stocks used as explana-
tory variables might not be the relevant measures since for instance the pool
of employed job seekers is neglected completely. We take a closer look at this
problem below and in Table 5-3. These results are indeed particularly in-
teresting in the light of the result of Broersma and Van Ours (1999). They
argue that ignoring relevant parts of the explanatory stock of job seekers
leads to an underestimation of the true value of the matching elasticity with
respect to the number of job seekers. This point will be discussed in more
detail below in section 5.2.
As was mentioned in section 3.2, the estimation results obtained so far
could potentially be biased due to problems of time aggregation and simul-
taneity, because ﬂows could aﬀect contemporaneous stocks used as explana-
tory variables. This is unlikely as we use stock data collected before the
beginning of the period for which matches are recorded.25
Another potential problem has been already mentioned before in the
data section. Explanatory variables are reported only for reference dates
22Note that including macro variables in a regression like time trends, GDP or GDP
growth leads to downwardly biased standard errors, see Moulton (1990). Acorrection of
the standard errors would therefore render the coeﬃcient estimates for time trend, GDP
and GDP growth less signiﬁcant. We refrain from a correction of the standard errors,
since the results for time trends have very low standard errors and are virtually identical
to those for time dummies, and because the coeﬃcients for GDP and GDP growth are
insigniﬁcant anyway.
23In speciﬁcations without time trend, coeﬃcients for GDP and GDP growth, respec-
tively, are negative and highly signiﬁcant.
24The respective empirical p−values are 0.345 and 0.164, respectively. Also, the null of
stationarity of the series of the stocks, unemployment and vacancies, could not be rejected.
Details are available from the authors upon request.
25In a companion paper (Fahr and Sunde, 2001b) we check robustness for using lagged
explanatory variables. The results remain qualitatively as well as quantitatively un-
changed.
13and therefore do not represent the correct measures for stocks of unem-
ployed and vacancies relevant for the estimation of matching functions. In
order to overcome this problem, the reference data have been adjusted us-
ing aggregate data on total yearly inﬂows into unemployment and registered
vacancies. Estimations of the same speciﬁcations of the matching functions
as in Table 5-2 using these adjusted stocks as explanatory variables deliver
almost identical results.26 We take this as an indication that the results
obtained with the non-adjusted data are reasonably robust and accurate.
Due to the similarity of the results obtained by including time trends
or time dummies, in what follows, matching functions will be estimated
including a time trend.
The results presented in Table 5-2 indicate that the sum of unemploy-
ment and vacancy elasticities of new matches sum up to less than one which
implies decreasing instead of constant returns to scale. The results of F-
tests for the null that the sum of the coeﬃcients equals one, that is constant
returns, clearly reject the constant returns hypothesis at any reasonable sig-
niﬁcance level. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the results of using more ﬂexible
functional forms of the matching function (see Fahr and Sunde, 2001b).27
Moreover, results for speciﬁcations with diﬀerent measures of matches, in
particular all hirings, hirings from non-employment and from unemploy-
ment, consistently lead to similarly strong rejections of the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale in favor of decreasing returns.
5.2 Matching Functions by Sources of Flows
The data set allows to disentangle new matches by the source of either the
successful job seekers or the type of successful vacancies. That is, success-
ful matches of formerly unemployed can be distinguished from successful
matches of individuals switching from another job to their new match, etc.
Table 5-3 presents the results for matching functions deﬁned by the sources
of ﬂows. The models presented replicate all ﬂow speciﬁcations used in the
literature as presented by Broersma and Van Ours (1999) using one single
data set and therefore allow for direct comparisons of the diﬀerent results.
[ Insert Table 5-3 about here. ]
The ﬁrst model (model (8)) repeats the results for taking total hirings
per occupation and period as was already displayed in Table 5-2. Across all
speciﬁcations, the time eﬀect is negative and, with exception of model 13,
signiﬁcant, which is a common result in the literature (see above).
26The estimation results for adjusted explanatory variables can be found in Fahr and
Sunde (2001b).
27See also Gross (1997) for similar ﬁndings for German aggregate data.
14Looking at hires from non-employment, which is the dependent variable
in model (9) we ﬁnd very similar coeﬃcients for the matching elasticities.28
Since the literature comes to mixed conclusions about the relative size of
the matching elasticities we take our outcomes as a consequence of using
an identical data set also for the benchmark model. This might also be an
indication for the robustness of our results. Due to the fact that ﬂows from
non-employment are very reliable, the results indicate that the biases due
to incompatibility of ﬂows and stocks used (Broersma and Van Ours, 1999)
or endogenous job competition (Mumford and Smith, 1999, Anderson and
Burgess, 2000) are rather moderate.
The main point of Broersma and Van Ours (1999) is to stress the im-
portance of specifying the matching function such that the measure of ﬂows
(new matches) corresponds to the measures of stocks of job seekers and
vacant positions. From a conceptual point of view, the models presented
in this section are problematic in this respect since, strictly speaking, one
would have to estimate e.g. model (10) with employed job seekers instead
of the stock of unemployed. However, the stock of employed actively search-
ing for a new job is not observable. Therefore, the stock of unemployed
might serve as an instrument for the stock of employed job seekers. But in
this case, problems regarding the composition of the pool of job seekers and
crowding out eﬀects, as investigated by Anderson and Burgess (2000) are
neglected. In turn, the estimated parameters might be biased due to the
misspeciﬁcation. Moreover, as was already mentioned in section 3.2, what
one would actually want to look at is the stocks of seekers at risk of being
matched, so one faces an additional measurement problem leading to biased
coeﬃcient estimates.
To sidestep these problems, and in order to be able to interpret the re-
sults for disaggregate matching functions in the remainder of the paper in
the context of the existing literature, in what follows we present results for
models of type (8), (9) and (11). We pay particular attention to models of
type (9). In this speciﬁcation, the outﬂows from non-employment into work
are estimated using the stock of unemployed job seekers and the stock of
registered vacancies. This implicitly assumes that the stock of unemployed
represents the relevant stock of non-employed job seekers suﬃciently well
and that non-employed, that is unemployed or individuals (re-)entering the
labor market, predominantly apply for registered instead of non-registered
vacancies. Arguably, this speciﬁcation minimizes problems related to mis-
speciﬁcation and mis-measurement.
An alternative would be to use the same explanatory variables for re-
gressing ﬂows from registered vacancies (model 13), assuming that these
28Bootstrapped panel stationarity tests reveal that the hypothesis that mX is level
stationary cannot be rejected, with the p-value of a type-I-error being 0.353. Likewise, we
cannot reject stationarity when a trend is included, with a p-value of 0.313.
15are (almost) exclusively ﬁlled with unemployed. However, the results in
Table 5-3 reveal that this speciﬁcation exhibits the strongest discrepancy
from the main pattern of results from all other speciﬁcations, in particu-
lar with respect to the estimated matching elasticities with respect to the
pool of unemployed. The coeﬃcient for unemployment is higher, the coef-
ﬁcient for vacancies lower than in all other cases. The signiﬁcantly higher
coeﬃcient in the model for ﬂows from registered vacancies could indeed be
an indication for endogenous search behavior of employed individuals which
is contained in this speciﬁcation but not in the other one for outﬂows from
non-employment: An additional job seeker has a higher impact in this model
because implicitly also some employed job seekers have the chance to lead
to a successful match. Therefore, the emphasis on models of type (9) in the
analysis of disaggregated matching functions is warranted.
The dependent variable in model (10) is hires from employment. Al-
though conceptually the model is misspeciﬁed at least with respect to the
pool of job seekers, which is the stock of unemployed, the results are very
similar to the ones obtained for the benchmark model. In contrast to the
results obtained by others, the coeﬃcient for vacancies is lower than the
coeﬃcient for the stock of unemployed.
Model (11) regresses matches from unemployment on the stock of un-
employed and the stock of vacancies. The elasticity of matches with respect
to the stock of job seekers is higher, the elasticity with respect to vacancies
lower than in the benchmark model.29 The intuition behind this result is
that total ﬂows into a job capture also jobs ﬁlled with employed job seek-
ers. Therefore, an identical increase in the stock of unemployed job seekers
leads to a smaller increment in total matches than if only unemployment
outﬂows into a new job are looked at, simply because there is crowding out
by employed job seekers. A similar argument can be given to explain the
smaller elasticity of vacancies for outﬂows from unemployment: Since the
pool of potential applicants actually is higher for total ﬂows to jobs than
for unemployment outﬂows, posting one more vacancy has a higher eﬀect
on total hirings than on unemployment outﬂows. Qualitatively the same re-
sults - a higher matching elasticity with respect to the stock of unemployed
than with respect to vacancies - is consistently found in the literature, albeit
with somewhat higher coeﬃcients for unemployment than obtained in the
present study. However, as mentioned before, the results for ﬂows from un-
employment as well as for ﬂows from out of the labor force to be inspected
below have to be interpreted with care as the data contain a potentially
large number of miscodings. Interestingly, the observation by Broersma and
Van Ours (1999) that estimates for returns to scale are upward biased when
29Bootstrap panel stationarity tests of the null of stationarity of mU deliver probabilities
for committing a type-I-error of 0.697 and 0.622 when a trend is excluded or included,
respectively. Hence we cannot reject stationarity.
16regressing mU instead of mall is not supported in our data.
If new matches of individuals from outside the labor force are taken as
the object of study (model 12), again the estimated elasticities are in line
with the previous ﬁndings. However, the coeﬃcient for vacancies is slightly
higher than in the other models and also higher than the coeﬃcient for the
stock of unemployed, indicating that the availability of job opportunities
might aﬀect the participation decision positively, as one would expect.30
For completeness, all models contained in Table 5-3 are estimated in a
two-way ﬁxed eﬀects panel speciﬁcation. The results are contained in Table
A4-3-4 in the appendix. The results change somewhat. In particular, the
diﬀerences between the alternative models become more pronounced. The
most striking diﬀerence is in the model estimated with ﬂows from employ-
ment as dependent variable (model 10’), where the elasticity with respect to
the stock of unemployed goes up from 46 percent to 57.5 percent in the panel
speciﬁcation, while the vacancy elasticity goes down from 41.7 percent to
27.1 percent with comparable explanatory powers of the models. Constant
returns to scale are unanimously rejected also in all panel models.
6 Matching by Occupational Groups
While the bulk of the existing literature on empirical matching functions
focuses on aggregate data and concentrates on the dynamic aspects of job
creation (and destruction), little is known about cross-sectional patterns of
matching. Recently, a few studies considered the regional dimension of labor
markets and analyzed regional diﬀerences in matching.31
While all studies ﬁnd eﬀects of spatial and/or industrial heterogeneity
on the matching outcomes, no study has used data disaggregated by occu-
pations.32 However, occupation might well be considered to deﬁne the rele-
vant labor markets as faced by participants, that is job seekers and vacancy
posting ﬁrms. Occupation captures skill requirements and characteristics,
similarities of tasks etc. and therefore deﬁnes the potential labor market on
which the participants search for a new match better than for example in-
dustry.33 Moreover, occupations are explicitly deﬁned in public data. This
30In order to check the robustness of the results, we estimated models (8) to (13) also
using lagged stocks as well as adjusted stocks to alleviate problems of simultaneity and
time aggregation, see Fahr and Sunde (2001b). Only the results for adjusted stocks only
diﬀer somewhat, conﬁrming our conﬁdence that the estimates obtained with unadjusted
explanatory variables are robust and reasonably accurate.
31See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of the - small - literature.
32Entorf (1998) uses information on occupations, but does not analyze the eﬀects of
occupations. He rather concentrates on the dynamic variation of matching functions and
Beveridge Curves. Van Ours and Ridder (1995) and Berman (1997) distinguish between
occupation-industry categories.
33Of course there might be correlations between certain industries and certain occupa-
tions.
17is even more true for the German education system in which there are edu-
cation and training certiﬁcates for nearly every occupation. Occupations are
deﬁned by the notiﬁcation of the employer (or the last employer if the indi-
vidual is currently not employed) in the individual’s social security records.
These notiﬁcations are not only reasonably precise but also keep track of
the working history of an individual. In contrast to that, the deﬁnition
of regional labor markets and travel-to-work areas arguably contains a bit
more arbitrariness. Therefore, exploring labor market structure and match-
ing functions for diﬀerent occupations is an important issue which has been
neglected so far. As described in the data section, we group occupations
into nine broad occupational groups.34 In order for matching functions to
be estimated in a meaningful way, stocks and ﬂows should correspond to
the same labor market. For this to be true, the ﬂows between occupations
should not be too high in order for the distinction of labor markets by oc-
cupations to be relevant. In particular, large ﬂows between groups would
aggravate the measurement error problem mentioned above in section 3.2
even more. However, in the data at hand, on average less than two percent
of the labor force change broad occupations in a given year. On average, less
than a third of all new hirings involves a change of broad occupation. The
bulk of these ﬂows between occupations is concentrated among a few groups
and the overall picture is that even fewer matches involve between group
changes.35 Therefore we emphasize occupations as deﬁning labor markets
as a feature of relevance which has been almost completely neglected so far.
Figure A1 in the appendix illustrates the evolution of the sizes of the broad
occupational groups over the entire observation period 1980 - 1995.
6.1 General Results Controlling for Occupation
Table 6-1 shows the results for estimations of the standard matching function
of speciﬁcation (3) when occupation dummies for nine broad occupational
groups are added. As already discussed before, the dummy for a given oc-
cupational group acts as augmenting the total factor productivity of the
matching function. Positive coeﬃcients indicate an increase in the overall
eﬃciency for the respective group, and negative coeﬃcients a decrease. In
order to obtain results that do not rely on which reference group is chosen,
we transform the dummy coeﬃcients following the approach suggested by
Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997). After regressing logged matches on a
set of explanatory variables and dummies (excluding a reference group), the
coeﬃcients obtained for the dummies are renormalized as weighted devia-
34Berman (1997) constructs seven industry-occupation groups. We focus only on occu-
pations and therefore construct groups which do not comprise any relation to industries
classiﬁcations.
35For example, about 20 percent of the ﬂows between broad occupational groups are
ﬂows between manufacturing occupations and crafts (groups 2 and 3).
18tions from the weighted mean of all groups.36 As a consequence, also the
variance-covariance matrix and the standard errors of the coeﬃcients are
adjusted.
[ Insert Table 6-1 about here. ]
In model (14), the dependent variable is all hirings, in model (15) only
matches from non-employment are considered as dependent variable. The
coeﬃcients for the stocks of job seekers and vacancies for all hirings and hir-
ings from non-employment are virtually identical to those already obtained
before in Tables 4-2 and 4-3. The null-hypothesis of constant returns to
scale can be rejected in all cases at any level of signiﬁcance. The results
for the dummies are striking. In models (14) and (15), except for group 9
(low skilled occupations), the dummy coeﬃcients are qualitatively identi-
cal. Those which are highly signiﬁcant are also quantitatively very similar
for both concepts of hirings used, with the exception of the primary sector.
The negative coeﬃcient means that new matches are less likely for members
of this group, than on average over all occupations. However, this disadvan-
tage is a lot smaller for matches from non-employment than for all hirings.
The groups for which the labor market seems to be particularly dynamic in
the sense that compared to the average ﬂows over all groups more matches
occur ceteris paribus, are high skilled and health occupations (groups 6 and
8). The opposite is true for technical occupations (group 4) which create
signiﬁcantly fewer matches ceteris paribus. One reason for this might be
that the market for these individuals is less dynamic, for example because
the positions they usually ﬁll have very particular skill requirements, high
capital intensities or bear high responsibility. Another interpretation is that
these jobs oﬀer generous compensation packages and that thus turnover is
low. Crafts (group 3) represent a relatively eﬃcient labor market with more
matches than the average. This could be explained by the fact that the
German apprenticeship system provides a homogeneously high level of hu-
man capital which is highly transferable, so more employment relations can
be created as desired skills are easily observed. For completeness, model
(16) is added where the dependent variable is matches from unemployment.
Constant returns can be rejected as in the two speciﬁcations described be-
fore. The other results are qualitatively the same with the exception of the
occupation dummies for manufacturing (group 2) and health (group 8) oc-
cupations. The former exhibits a signiﬁcant positive, the latter a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect, exactly opposite to what is found when regressing all hirings
or hirings from non-employment.
Instead of pooling the data, we also estimated random eﬀects and two-
way ﬁxed eﬀects models. Hausman tests reveal that if broad occupations are
36The group sizes which are necessary as weights for the deviations as well as for the
calculation of the mean are given by the number of occupations contained in the respective
broad occupational group, because occupations are the unit of observation.
19the relevant group variable, both approaches are absolutely identical with
respect to their coeﬃcient estimates for all models shown in Table 6-2. For
all hirings as the dependent variable we get identical results as in the pooling
case (with estimates of 0.459 for α and 0.369 for β regardless of the panel
methodology used). For hirings from non-employment we get coeﬃcients
(with standard errors in parentheses) for the supply elasticity α of 0.408
(0.022) and for the demand elasticity β of 0.424 (0.018) which diﬀer slightly
from the pooling case.37
6.2 Results for Broad Occupational Groups
As seen before, if the matching function is imposed to have identical elastic-
ities for stocks of job seekers and vacancies, as was done in the estimations
with occupation dummies included, constant returns to scale are rejected in
favor of decreasing returns to scale. In this subsection, matching functions
of the same form (eq. 3) are estimated separately for each broad occupation
group. The results are presented in Tables 6-2 and 6-3.
Model (17) takes all hires for the respective occupation group as depen-
dent variable, while the dependent variable in model (18) is hirings from
non-employment for the respective occupation group.38 Bootstrapped panel
tests for stationarity carried out for each broad occupational group and for
each deﬁnition of ﬂows (mall, mX, mU) separately unambigously show that
the null of stationarity cannot be rejected.39 A ﬁrst inspection shows that
the results are very similar for both concepts of ﬂows used. When total
matches are looked at, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale can be
rejected at any reasonable signiﬁcance level.
[ Insert Tables 6-2 and 6-3 about here. ]
As before, one model takes all hirings as dependent variable (model 17),
while another looks at hirings from non-employment only. With respect to
the question of returns to scale, the results are almost identical. Constant re-
turns to scale cannot be rejected for occupations in the primary sector (group
1), for service occupations (group 5) and for health occupations (group 8),
and this is consistent regardless of which measure for matches is used as
dependent variable. The only exception is low skilled (group 9), for which
constant returns can be accepted for total hirings, but has to be rejected
once hirings from non-employment are regressed. Interestingly, crafts and
37For hirings from unemployment, the respective estimates for α and β are 0.407 (0.031)
and 0.449 (0.026).
38For matters of completeness and comparison, Table 6-3 contains estimates for all
hirings (model 17) and hirings from unemployment (model 19).
39The null is that all time series in the respective panels are stationary processes. All
tests control for serial dependence in the errors. Detailed results are available from the
authors upon request.
20technical occupations (groups 3 and 4) exhibit increasing returns to scale.
The overall picture is therefore very mixed. The degree of homogeneity of
the matching function very much depends on the occupation under consid-
eration. Moreover, the argument of increasing returns on the micro level
and constant returns on the macro level as suggested in the literature (see
Diamond (1982) and Coles and Smith (1998) for a microfoundation based on
overlap of adjacent labor markets) seems to be supported only to a limited
extent by our data.
Furthermore, also with respect to the sizes of the coeﬃcients for stocks
of unemployed and vacancies, the results reveal a pronounced heterogeneity
across groups. The overall picture is the same regardless of what measure
for matches is taken as the dependent variable. Roughly speaking, there are
three categories of occupations. For groups 1, 7 and 9 (manufacturing, social
and low skilled occupations), new matches are more elastic with respect to
the stock of vacancies than unemployment. The opposite is true for all other
groups, and particularly strong in technical occupations. The only exception
is manufacturing (group 2) where labor supply and demand have about
equal weights in creating new hires. Also the time trends exhibit interesting
diﬀerences across groups.40 The coeﬃcient for the time trend is negative and
signiﬁcant at the aggregate as well as for most groups when taken separately
with a value of about three to ﬁve percent. The negative value is largest for
primary sector occupations (group 1) with around 12 percent. On the other
hand, the coeﬃcient for the time trend is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for technical, white collar, social and low skilled occupations (groups
4, 6, 7 and 9). This indicates that, when taken separately, overall matching
eﬃciency did not decrease in all labor markets over the time period under
consideration.41
7 Matching by Level of Educational Attainment
The discussion above indicated that there is considerable heterogeneity in
the workings of labor markets for diﬀerent occupations. This section takes
a closer look at the matching functions for diﬀerent educational cohorts.
The modus operandi is the following: First, we look at matching functions
estimated separately for diﬀerent educational groups. Then, the interactions
40The detailed results are not contained in the table, but are available from the authors
upon request.
41For better comparability among groups, Fahr and Sunde (2001b) contains estimates
that result from imposing constant returns to scale for each occupational group. Panel
estimates for the models shown are also available from the authors upon request. While
again speciﬁcation ﬁnd no systematic diﬀerences between results from ﬁxed and random
eﬀects models, the results diﬀer in detail somewhat from the results in Tables 6-2 and 6-3.
However, the main conclusions, in particular that of strong heterogeneity across groups,
remain unaﬀected.
21between education and occupation are examined more closely.42
7.1 Matching by Educational Groups
We divide individuals into three groups according to the education level
they attained: We distinguish individuals with low educational backgrounds
(group 1), deﬁned as neither having successfully completed high-school (with-
out Abitur), nor having completed an apprenticeship. Group 2 consists of
individuals with an intermediate level of education, that is with either high-
school diploma (Abitur), or completed apprenticeship, or both. Finally,
we assort all individuals with a university degree or a degree from an ap-
plied university or polytechnic (Fachhochschule) into a high education group
(group 3).
Table 7-1 presents summary statistics on group sizes and the ﬂows from
the diﬀerent sources as obtained for the diﬀerent educational groups under
consideration. More than half of all hirings are made up for by the inter-
mediate education group, while this group constitutes more than 60 percent
of the population.43 Less than 15 percent of total matches can be traced
back to highly educated individuals who make up for less than 12 percent of
all individuals. That is, with respect to their group sizes, highly educated
and less educated are overrepresented in total matchings, the intermedi-
ate education group is underrepresented. This changes when one considers
diﬀerent measures of hirings. When looking at job-to-job matches, more
than 65 percent can be attributed to individuals of intermediate education,
whose share of employed is about 62 percent. About a ﬁfth of hirings from
employment go to individuals of low education, who represent around 27
percent of employed, and the rest of about 14 percent of job-to-job matches
involve highly educated, while only 11 percent of employed are belonging to
this group. Thus, groups 2 and 3 are overrepresented, group 1 forms fewer
hirings from employment as would correspond to its size. This somewhat
contradicts the conventional wisdom of the highly educated making up for
the bulk of job-to-job changes.
Surprisingly, when it comes to hirings from non-employment, less edu-
cated form more matches (almost 41 percent) than would be expected from
their share of non-employed (less than 34 percent). On the other hand, mem-
bers of the intermediate and the high group form fewer (44 %) and much
fewer (14.6 %) matches than would be expected from their shares of the pool
of employed (46 and almost 20 percent, respectively). This indicates that
42Again, strictly speaking, the ﬂows are not regressed on the correct corresponding
stocks, because neither the stock of unemployed per year and occupation is available by
education groups, nor - trivially - the stock of vacancies.
43Group sizes are relatively stable with the share of individuals with low education
decreasing somewhat over time in favor of increases of the other two groups. Fahr and
Sunde (2001b) contains a Figure displaying the development of the relative sizes of the
educational groups over the entire observation period 1980 - 1995.
22those with low education actually form more matches from non-employment
than would be expected from their relative group size. This eﬀect is even
more pronounced when matches from out of the labor force are considered.
The low education group, which is about 27 percent of the population (and
less than 34 percent of non-employed), contributes almost 48 percent of the
ﬂows, while intermediate education only contributes to less than 37 percent
but constitutes more than 60 percent of all individuals (and 46 percent of
non-employed). Highly educated create relatively more matches from out of
the labor force than their relative size (15.5 percent versus 11.84 percent),
but less than their proportion of non-employment (19.8 percent). This sug-
gests that individuals with low education exhibit the lowest attachment to
the labor market, and that they revise their participation decision more
often than more educated people.
[ Insert Table 7-1 about here. ]
Moreover, within the low education group, hirings from out of the labor
force represent almost two thirds of all matches of this group, with matches
from employment being a mere 18 percent. This means that the probability
of having to go through an unemployment spell or even some period of non-
participation is very high for members of this group. This pattern changes
for intermediate education. More than 40 percent of all matches of this
group are job-to-job matches, more than 27 percent are matches from un-
employment. Surprisingly, the high education group has a distribution of all
hirings that lies in between the two other groups. Particularly noteworthy is
that a good 30 percent of their new hirings are matches from employment,
while almost 50 percent are hirings from out of the labor force. Intuitively
this means that highly educated either switch jobs directly or stop partici-
pating for some time (possibly living of their bonuses) before entering a new
employment relation, while only a ﬁfth goes through an unemployment spell
before forming a new match.
The standard matching function is regressed for ﬂows for three diﬀerent
educational groups. The results for matching functions for all ﬂows mall and
hires from non-employment mX a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e7 - 2 . 44 Interestingly,
the hypothesis that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale
can only be rejected in favor of decreasing returns to scale for the matching
function estimated for the intermediate group using all hires. Regardless of
the measure used as dependent variable, the group of low education produces
the highest coeﬃcient for the stock of unemployed and the lowest coeﬃcient
for vacancies. This indicates that an additional job seeker in this group
creates a new match with a relatively higher probability than in the other
groups. The opposite is true for a person in the intermediate group. On the
44Panel stationarity tests reveal that the null of stationarity of all hirings and hirings
from non-employment cannot be rejected for any of the three educational groups.
23other hand, an additional vacancy creates relatively fewer matches in the
low group than in the high, and in particular the intermediate group.
[ Insert Table 7-2 about here. ]
The interpretation for this is straightforward. A given vacancy targets
mostly intermediately and highly educated individuals, thus produces rel-
atively more matches for members of these groups. On the other hand,
variation in the stock of unemployment explains most matches for the low
educated. This can either mean that this group is particularly aﬀected by
cyclical variations or that the labor market for this group is very dynamic in
the sense that many matches split up after a short period of time, therefore
creating a lot of variation in both matches and the stock of unemployed.
Moreover, group 1 also exhibits a negative time trend that is about three
times as large as the trend for the other groups, regardless of the dependent
variable used, which could be taken as an indication for decreasing labor
market eﬃciency for these people, or even a sign for skill biased technologi-
cal change.
7.2 Educational Groups and Occupational Diﬀerences
In this subsection we repeat the estimations of empirical matching functions
for diﬀerent educational levels with controls for broad occupational groups.
Table 7-3 summarizes the ﬁndings for regressing total hirings in the standard
speciﬁcation including occupational dummies. The coeﬃcient estimates for
stocks of job seekers and vacancies are similar to the ones obtained with the
speciﬁcation without occupations. The elasticity of matches with respect to
vacancies is somewhat higher in this speciﬁcation, about 10 percent higher in
the group with low education attainment, about 7 percent higher in the high
education group, and about 3 percent in the intermediate cohort. Again, the
time trend is negative for low and intermediate education, but insigniﬁcantly
positive for individuals with high education. The null of constant returns
to scale of the matching function can be rejected for intermediate and high
education groups in favor of decreasing returns.
[ Insert Table 7-3 about here. ]
As in the preceeding section, we repeated the estimation of the models
in Table 7-2 using the method of seemingly unrelated regression. As for age
groups, the null hypothesis of identical unemployment and vacancy elastic-
ities for matches of either deﬁnition across education groups, respectively,
can be rejected at any reasonable level.45 Moreover, also the hypotheses of
either identical vacancy elasticities for all groups or identical unemployment
elasticities for all groups can as well be rejected.
45See Tables A7-2-1 and A7-2-2 for detailed results obtained with SURE.
24Once again, the occupation eﬀects are interesting. As compared to the
average over all occupations, manufacturing occupations (group 2) exhibit
relatively more matches for individuals with low education, but fewer for
individuals with intermediate or high education attainment. Similarly, low
and middle education groups create more matches in crafts (group 3) than
the average, high education leads to fewer matches. Exactly the opposite
is true for technical occupations (group 4), service and white collar occupa-
tions (groups 5 and 6), and social and health related occupations (groups 7
and 8). In these occupations, low education exhibits lower matching rates
(in particular for technical and social occupations). On the other hand,
intermediate and in particular high education leads to more matches than
average, where the positive eﬀects are strongest for technical, white collar
and social occupations. Primary occupations (group 1) form fewer matches
in general, regardless of the occupation, while the negative eﬀect is insigniﬁ-
cant for high and low education. Oddly, in low skilled occupations (group 9),
high and low education lead to more matches than on average, while inter-
mediate education exhibits fewer matches. Most of these occupation eﬀects
probably have to do with the fact that the structure of skill requirements
diﬀers systematically across occupations and thus determines the number
of ﬂows in diﬀerent education groups as education is systematically related
with the skills required.
Table 7-4 presents the results for matchings from non-employment as
dependent variable.46 The coeﬃcient estimates are quite similar to those
obtained before, with the exception that the unemployment elasticity for
the low education group is about 7 percent and for the intermediate group
about 4 percent higher than when regressed for all hirings. Constant returns
to scale can be rejected for all three education groups. However, while this
is done in favor of decreasing returns for intermediate and high education,
the matching function for low education seems to exhibit increasing returns
to scale. The pattern of interactions between education and occupation,
captured by the dummy coeﬃcient estimates is virtually identical apart
from minor diﬀerences concerning signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients.
[ Insert Table 7-4 about here. ]
Matching functions for the three education groups have been estimated
as seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE) separately for all nine occupation
groups.47 The hypothesis that unemployment elasticities are the same for
all three age groups cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level for primary
(1), white collar (6), social (7) occupations regardless of the measure for
46Results for hirings from unemployment as dependent variable diﬀer substantially from
those obtained with all hirings and hirings from non-employment and are contained in Fahr
and Sunde (2001b). But as before we forbear from a detailed interpretation.
47Detailed Results are available from the authors upon request.
25matches. The null for identical vacancy elasticity for all education groups
can be rejected at the 5 percent level for all occupations. The same is true
for the null of both elasticities being the same across educational groups.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Summarizing the investigations of empirical matching functions disaggre-
gated along diﬀerent dimensions, the most striking, although not too sur-
prising, ﬁnding is the apparent heterogeneity of the matching technology
for diﬀerent categories of jobs and workers. While the results presented for
the aggregate matching function ﬁt nicely into the ﬁndings reported in the
literature, this aggregate matching function seems to be made up of very
distinct matching functions on very distinct labor markets with very distinct
characteristics of the matching process. The stylized results are the follow-
ing: In general with only few exceptions, constant returns to scale of the
matching function is rejected on the aggregate as well as on disaggregate
levels. On the aggregate level, we ﬁnd evidence for decreasing returns to
scale.
On the occupational level, matching technologies for some occupations
exhibit increasing returns to scale while at the same time those for other
occupations exhibit decreasing returns. Some occupations exhibit a rela-
tively high elasticity of matches with respect to the stock of job seekers,
indicating that matches are relatively more supply determined, while this
elasticity is relatively low for others. Examples for the former group are
technical occupations, for the latter low skilled occupations. The same goes
for the elasticity with respect to vacancies. Also diﬀerences in the absolute
values of these elasticities are substantial across occupations.
Moreover, the patterns of this heterogeneity are modiﬁed once other
concepts of ﬂows like e.g. those from non-employment are looked at instead
of all hirings within a profession. This sheds some more light on issues like
whether the employment status matters for ﬁnding new employment and
whether there is crowding out from employed job seekers.
Also, matching technologies are quite heterogenous for members of dif-
ferent education groups indicating that labor markets are heterogeneous
also along this dimension. We ﬁnd evidence that suggests that matches are
more demand-determined for lower educational levels, indicating relative de-
mand shortages for members of this group as compared to higher educated.
However, the results diﬀer across occupations, leading to the impression
of diﬀerent systematic education eﬀects on matching for diﬀerent types of
skills.
The main implication from these ﬁndings is a caveat on the usefulness of
an aggregate matching function to explain the working of the labor market
as a whole since it discards a lot of potentially important information. In
26particular, for the conduct of economic policy it might be indispensable to
look beyond the aggregate level in order to have a clear understanding of
the structure of labor markets, and the pattern of frictions at work.
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31A Data Appendix
The data used for the empirical analysis are yearly data for Western Germany
disaggregated into 83 occupational groups. They are reported in oﬃcial labor
statistics as published in the Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fuer Arbeit.
For all estimations the occupational group collecting all unspeciﬁed occupations
(other occupations), trainees and apprentices (group 98) is dropped, which leaves
us with 82 occupational groups throughout the empirical analysis. The occupational
groups were further clustered in nine broad occupational groups (see Table A1 for
details). The data include information on unemployment, vacancies, employment
levels as well as ﬂows from registered vacancies to employment. The stock data are
reported as measured on the 30th of September of each year as reference date. The
ﬂows from registered vacancies to employment are reported as the ﬂows aggregated
over one year. As an further attempt to reproduce the relevant stocks for job
seekers and vacancies for the entire period and check the robustness of our results,
the stocks of occupational measures as reported on the reference date of each year
are augmented by a correction factor. This factor is obtained by dividing the
aggregate ﬂows aggregated over an entire period by the stock of the aggregate
measure at the reference date (30.09.). This practice is necessary due to the lack
of detailed vacancy ﬂows data on the disaggregate (occupational) level.
The hirings were constructed using an anonymized representative 1% sample
of Western German social security records from the German Institute for Employ-
ment Research (IAB). The basis of the IAB employment subsample 1975-1995 is
the integrated notifying procedure for health insurance, statutory pension scheme
and unemployment insurance which is regulated through German legislation. The
employment statistics include all employees obliged to pay social insurance contri-
butions and covers about 80% of all employed persons in Western Germany. In total
this data set includes 6,711,153 notiﬁcations of 483,327 Western Germans (calcu-
lated on the basis of ﬁnal notiﬁcations) (cf. Bender et al., 2000). The data contain
information on individual characteristics, as well as a ﬁrm identiﬁer. They are sup-
plemented by person-related information on periods in which the Federal Employ-
ment Service paid beneﬁts from the beneﬁts recipients ﬁle. With this information
the hirings from diﬀerent sources could be identiﬁed. A ﬂow from employment to
employment is identiﬁed by observing a change in the ﬁrm identiﬁer while an in-
dividual is employed (pays social security contributions) from on year to another.
There is a negligible measurement error, because a change in the ﬁrm identiﬁer
could result from a merger or a move between diﬀerent plants of the same ﬁrm. A
hiring from unemployment is identiﬁed by observing in one year the notiﬁcation of
an individual as stemming from the beneﬁts recipients ﬁle (characterizing the indi-
vidual as an unemployment beneﬁts receiver) while observing the information for
the individual in the next year in the employed sample. Accordingly a ﬂow from out
of the labor force to employment is identiﬁed by missing information on the status
in one year (neither employed nor unemployed) while ﬁnding this individual in the
employed (social security contribution paying) sample in the next year. Because
the employment status is identiﬁed by social security payments, self-employed and
individuals in low-paid jobs which are exempt from social security contributions
show up as being out of the labor force. Thus, some ﬂows measured as hirings from
out of the labor force are in fact hirings from employment.
In addition, there are some sources of measurement error in distinguishing ﬂows
32from out of the labor into employment from ﬂows from unemployment. This is due
to the fact that there are three sources of mistaking an unemployed as an individual
from out of the labor force. Firstly, information from the beneﬁts recipients ﬁle
could only be matched to the data from the employment subsample when the
recipient had a social security number. But between 1.4% and 8% of all notiﬁcations
in the beneﬁts recipients ﬁle are reported without a social security number (see
Bender et al. 1996). The hiring from an unemployed who received unemployment
beneﬁts without having a social security number would be mistaken as a hiring
from out of the labor force. Secondly, certain preconditions have to be fulﬁlled to
be entitled to receive unemployment beneﬁts. This means that some people are
unemployed without receiving unemployment beneﬁts and could therefore not be
identiﬁed as unemployed in the data set. Finally the beneﬁt recipients ﬁle does not
record all beneﬁts paid by the Federal Employment Service. Some payments related
to measure of active labor market policies did not show up in the beneﬁts recipients
ﬁle (for a detailed list see Bender et al. 1996). All three source of measurement
error lead to a considerable underreporting of hirings from unemployment while
measuring to many hirings from out to the labor force.
Because the anonymization procedure leads to missings in the codings of occu-
pations which are not found in the oﬃcial statistics, only the relative hirings in the
sub-sample are regarded as representative. In order to obtain absolute values the
relative numbers of hirings for each occupations were multiplied by the respective
occupational employment levels from aggregate labor statistics.
To keep the data comparable to the aggregated data from labor statistics and
due to some measurement error in the data in the years before 1980 we retain all
observations from 1980 to 1995, with the exception of notiﬁcations for a second
job, for the construction of total hirings per year. The hirings for a speciﬁc occu-
pation for a speciﬁc year were calculated by comparing all employees at the 30th of
September of each year in a speciﬁc occupation and with a speciﬁc ﬁrm identiﬁer
to the values of these variables and the variable denoting the employment status
(stating whether the observation for an individual is taken from the employment
statistics or from the beneﬁts recipients ﬁle) at the previous reference date. A prob-
lem of this procedure is that one misses short employment spells which take place
within the year. The 30th of September was chosen to make the hirings information
comparable to the data on the occupational level.
B A Bootstrapping Procedure to Test Panels for
Stationarity
Recently, there has been a vivid interest in testing panel data for unit roots or
stationarity. As in short time series, a small number of usable observations poses
an additional problem for inference. A commonly accepted test strategy for panels
is to test individual time series of the single cross-sectional units and then to con-
struct a common test statistic for the entire panel. The challenge is to infer as much
as possible about the intertemporal structure of the data without destroying (sys-
tematic) cross-sectional dependencies and heterogeneity. This appendix proposes
a version of the bootstrap methodology introduced by Li and Maddala (1996) and
Maddala and Wu (1999) modiﬁed for the use for panel data stationarity tests.
33B.1 Issues in Resampling/Creation of the Bootstrap
The conventional bootstrap methodology presented must be modiﬁed in order to
account for panel structures in form of cross-sectional dependencies. The strategy
presented in this section roughly follows Maddala and Wu (1999), Chang (2000)
and Yin and Wu (2000), and proposes a way for obtaining bootstrap results for
null hypotheses of unit roots or stationarity for panels.48
Following Hadri (2000), consider a panel sample of random variables yit,w h e r e
i =1 ,2,...,N denotes the cross-sectional dimension and t =1 ,2,...,T denotes the
time dimension. The data are generated by the model:
yit = rit(+γit)+ it. (4)
We assume that rit is a random walk:
rit = rit−1 + uit. (5)
The  it and uit are mutually independent normally distributed and i.i.d. across i and
over t.49 Moreover, E[ it]=0 ,E[ 2
it]=σ2
  > 0, E[uit]=0a n dE[u2
it]=σ2
u ≥ 0.
We want to test stationarity of the series for all i. This is done by testing the
hypothesis that σ2
u =0 . 50




uiτ +  it = ri0(+γit)+eit. (6)
with eit =
 t
τ=1 uiτ + iτ.T h u s ,i fσ2
u =0 ,eit is reduced to  it and thus stationary.
The test is then formulated as:







The following steps describe the procedure to obtain bootstrapped test statis-
tics for testing the null.
STEP 1: Create residuals
The sample of residuals to be bootstrapped is created under the null to be
tested. Let εi,t be the relevant sample residuals for unit i at time t:
∀i,t : ε0






















48Strictly speaking, the contribution goes a bit further, since Maddala and Wu (1999)
only test for unit roots, while Yin and Wu (2000) perform a Monte Carlo study on the
behavior of stationarity tests.
49The  it could also be serially correlated.
50Under the null, yit is stationary around a level if no time trend is included in model
(4), and stationary around a trend if the trend is included.
51Note that Z is a pivotal statistic, that is a statistic whose distribution is independent
of the true parameter of the model.
34In practice, we regress yit on a constant (and where appropriate a time trend) only,
and use the coeﬃcient estimates ˆ ri0 and ˆ γ to calculate the residuals ε0
it under the
null. For each individual cross-sectional unit, there is a time series of residuals
under the null, and the time series for all units have the same dimensions. The
bootstrap proposed below relies on the assumption of a balanced panel, that is that
Ti = T ∀i =1 ,2,...,N. If the panel to be investigated is not balanced, the creation
of bootstrap samples has to be modiﬁed.
STEP 2: Create Sample Statistics ˆ Z
In order to create the sample statistic ˆ Z, we use again the residuals ε0
it created
under the null (using estimated coeﬃcients for constant and trend if appropriate)

















iτ is the partial sum of residuals, and σ2
ε0 is a consistent estima-
tor of σ2
ε under the null. In order to capture the underlying panel structure as good
as possible, one can think of estimating the parameters needed (the constant and
γ) not only by using e.g. OLS equation by equation. Panel estimation methods,
like Fixed Eﬀects models could be estimated as well as SURE models.
Intuitively, in order to reject the null for a given unit i, this statistic should
have an absolute value as large as possible.
STEP 3: Create Bootstrap Sample
Note that now B ×N bootstrap samples have to be generated. The core of the
sampling strategy is to permute the time dimension of the panel in order to create
bootstrap samples E∗ from E0 while losing as little of the cross-sectional correlation
as possible. To preserve the cross-correlation structure of the error term, draw (with
replacement) B samples of size T from the sample residual matrix E obtained in
STEP 1 by only permuting entire rows, that is keeping the cross-section index ﬁxed.
Denote the rows of E0 as E0
t =( ε1,t,ε 2,t,...,εN,t),t∈ [1,T]. Then, similar to the
simple time series case, the matrix of bootstrap residuals can be generated by



























STEP 4: Create Bootstrap Panel Data
The data necessary to construct the coeﬃcients and statistics for the statistical
inference have to be created using the bootstrap residuals and obeying the null. As
in the time series case, the bootstrap data for bootstrap samples b =1 ,...,B (using
all B bootstrap matrices E∗) are constructed:
∀i,t : y∗
i,t(b)= ˆ ri0(+ˆ γt)+ε∗
i,t(b),i =1 ,...,N, t =1 ,...T. (11)
35STEP 5: Create Bootstrap Statistics
STEP 2 has to be replicated (panel regression of y∗
it on a constant and possibly
a trend) to obtain new residuals that allow to construct the bootstrap statistics
ˆ Z∗. Note that, depending on the estimation technique used in STEP 2 for the
sample estimates, this might again call for panel estimation techniques. Of course
for obtaining an empirical distribution for each of the ˆ Z∗,t h i si sd o n eB times using
all the bootstrap samples previously created. The result of this step should be a
set of B statistics ˆ Z∗. The construction of an empirical bootstrap distribution of
test statistics for all panels is straightforward:
−→ ˆ F∗ := CDFB( ˆ Z∗) (12)
STEP 6: Statistical Inference for Cross-sectional Units using Boot-
strap Statistics
The entire enterprise has the purpose to infer whether the original sample statis-
tic is such that the null can be rejected. In order to make this inference, one has
to ﬁnd out which quantile of the distribution ˆ F∗ is deﬁned by the original sample
statistic ˆ Z, that is which is the empirical (bootstrap) p-value of ˆ Z. The interpreta-
tion of this p-value has to take into account under which null it was obtained. The
hypothesis to test was whether the null holds for the entire sample rather than only
for the series at hand for which the p-value was constructed. Still, the information
obtained by this investigation uses (or imposes) more structure than if only every








farmer, fisher  01  1 
agricultural administrator  03  1 
helper in the agricultural sector, agricultural 





gardener, florist  05  1 
forester and huntsman  06  1 
miner and related professions  07  2 
exhauster of mineral resources  08  2 
mineral rehasher, mineral burner  09  2 
stone processor  10  2 
,producer of building materials  11  2 
ceramicist, glazier  12  2 
glazier, glass processor, glass refiner  13  3 
chemical worker  14  2 
polymer processor  15  2 
paper producer  16  2 
printer 17  2 
woodworker, wood processor  18  3 
metal worker  19  2 
moulder, caster, semi-metal cleaner  20  2 
metal press workers, metal formers  21  2 
turner, cutter, driller, metal polisher  22  2 
metal burnisher, galvanizer, enameler   23  2 
welder, solderer, riveter, metal gluter  24  2 
steel smith, copper smith  25  2 
plumber, plant locksmith  26  3 
locksmith, fitter  27  3 
mechanic 28  3 
toolmaker 29  2 
metal precision-workers, orthodontists, opticians  30  3 
electricians 31  3 
assemblers and metal related professions  32  2 
spinner, ropemaker  33  2 
weaver, other textile producer  34  2 
tailor, sewer  35  2 
textile dyer  36  2 
leather and fur manufacturers, shoemaker  37  2 
baker, confectioner  39  3 
butcher, fishworkmansip and related  40  3 
cooks, convenience food preparatory  41  3 
brewer, manufacturer for tobacco products  42  2 
milk/fat processor, nutriments producer  43  2 
bricklayer, concrete builder  44  3 
carpenter, roofer, spiderman  45  3 






helper in the construction sector  47  3 
plasterer, tiler, glazier, screed layer   48  3 
interior designer, furniture supplier  49  3 
joiner, modeler, cartwright  50  3 
painter, varnisher and related professions  51  3 
goods tester, consignment professions  52  2 
unskilled worker  53  9 




engineer, architect  60  4 
chemist, physicist  61  4 
technician 62  4 
technical specialist  63  4 
merchandise manager  68  5 
banking professional, insurance merchant  69  6 






conductor, driver, motorist  71  5 
navigator, ship engineer, water/air traffic professions  72  5 
mail distributer  73  5 
storekeeper, worker in storage and transport  74  9 
manager, consultant, accountant.  75  6 
member of parliament, association manager  76  6 
accounting clerk, cashier, data processing expert  77  6 
clerk, typist, secretary   78  6 
plant security, guard, gate keeper, servant  79  5 






law related professions  81  5 
publicist, translator, librarian  82  7 
artist and related professions  83  7 
physician, dentist, apothecaries  84  8 
nurse, helper in nursing, receptionist and related  85  8 
social worker, care taker  86  7 
professor, teacher  87  7 
scientist 88  7 
helper for cure of souls and cult  89  7 
beauty culture  90  8 
guest assistant, steward, barkeeper  91  5 
domestic economy, housekeeping  92  5 
cleaning industry related professions  93  5 
trainee, apprentice  98  ** 
 
*The occupations are merged into the following broad occupational groups: 
(1) Primary  sector 
(2)  Industry and manufacturing 
(3) Crafts 
(4) Technical   
(5) Service   
(6)  White collar/ clerical  
(7)  Social and cultural  
(8) Health 
(9) Low  skilled 
 















 100  %
   
Employement levels 
 
 21,500,186   
Unemployed 
￿
 1,863,583    7.97  % 
Vacancies 
￿
 211,377    0.90  % 

￿
    
total:  
  DOO  3,475,697  100  % 
from nonemployment:  
  ;  2,384,188  68.60  % 
from employment:  
  (  1,091,509  31.40  % 
from unemployment:  
  8  800,725  23.04  % 
from out of labor force:  
  2/  1,583,460  45.56  % 
from registered vacancies:  
  5  2,038,274  58.64  % 
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  (1)*  (2)**  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 










































Time  dummies  No No  Yes***  Yes***  No No No 
Dummies for 9 broad 
occupational groups 
No Yes    No    Yes  No No No 









2  0.858 0.878 0.860 0.879 0.858 0.863 0.864 
Observations  1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1147 1147 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for dummies are available from the authors upon request. 
*     F-statistic for H0: constant returns to scale of the matching function with respect to unemployment and vacancies  
   (α ￿β  1): F(1, 1307) = 128.72. 
**   F-statistic for constant returns to scale: F(1, 1299) = 186.23.  














































































2  0.858 0.839 0.810 0.710 0.836 0.616 
Observations  1311 1310 1308 1298 1308  640 














Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
* In contrast to flows from pools of job seekers, data of flows from registered vacancies are only available for a broader classification of 40 


















Log unemployed:   0.446*  (0.018)   0.456*  (0.017)  0.538*  (0.029) 
Log registered vacancies:   0.379*  (0.017)   0.379*  (0.016)  0.337*  (0.024) 
Linear time trend     - 0.031* 
 
(0.003)     - 0.034*  (0.003)     - 0.031*  (0.004) 
Group 1 (primary/agricultural)     - 0.152  (0.082)     - 0.046  (0.099)    0.044  (0.149) 
Group 2 (industry/manufacturing)     - 0.126*  (0.021)     - 0.127*  (0.023)    0.091*  (0.029) 
Group  3  (crafts)   0.099*  (0.019)   0.160*  (0.020)  0.310*  (0.032) 
Group 4 (technical occupations)     - 0.204*  (0.055)     - 0.378*  (0.057)     - 0.635*  (0.082) 
Group 5 (services)     - 0.040  (0.038)     - 0.041  (0.037)     - 0.192*  (0.050) 
Group 6 (white collar/clerical)    0.526*  (0.041)    0.326*  (0.047)     - 0.024  (0.046) 
Group 7 (social and cultural)     - 0.067  (0.057)     - 0.009  (0.061)     - 0.506*  (0.061) 
Group 8 (health)    0.332*  (0.042)    0.306*  (0.038)     - 0.393*  (0.082) 
Group 9 (low skilled)     - 0.014  (0.060) 
 
 0.008  (0.062)  0.237*  (0.069) 
R
2 0.878  0.855  0.747 
Observations 1311  1310  1298 
H0: constant returns to scale  F(1,1299) = 186.23  F(1,1298) = 134.91  F(1,1286) = 52.41 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. For a detailed description of the definition of occupational groups, refer to the data 
appendix. Coefficients and standard errors are obtained using a 2-step procedure following Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997). 
The first step provides robust OLS-results with group 1 as reference group. On the second step, dummy coefficients are 
renormalized as deviations weighted by group-size from a group-size weighted mean (where group size refers to the number of 
occupations contained in a group) and standard errors are adjusted accordingly. The procedure therefore renders the results 
independent from the choice of the reference group. 










hirings from non-employment 
; 
  α  β  CRS Obs.  R
2  α  β  CRS Obs.  R
2 
















































































































































Note: α  is the estimated coefficient for ln8, β  is the estimated coefficient for ln9. All models are estimated including a constant and a linear time 
trend. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Insignificant coefficients are set in italics. CRS: Contains the F-statistics for H0: The 
matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. For a detailed description of the definition of occupational groups, refer to the data 
appendix. 
* H0: Constant returns to scale can be rejected on the 5%-level. 










hirings from unemployment 
8 
  α  β  CRS Obs.  R
2  α  β  CRS Obs.  R
2 
















































































































































Note: α  is the estimated coefficient for ln8, β  is the estimated coefficient for ln9. All models are estimated including a constant and a linear time 
trend. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Insignificant coefficients are set in italics. CRS: Contains the F-statistics for H0: The 
matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. For a detailed description of the definition of occupational groups, refer to the data 
appendix. 
* H0: Constant returns to scale can be rejected on the 5%-level. 


















       
)* "+      
sample population 
 
  100 %  27.40 %  60.76 %  11.84 % 
employed 
 
  100 %  26.98 %  61.66 %  11.36 % 
non-employed    100 %  33.81 %  46.37 %  19.82 % 
       

 
     
total matchings:   DOO 
 









from employment:   (￿
 









from nonemployment:   ;￿
 









from unemployment:   8￿
 









from out of labor force:   2/￿
 









Note: All data are aggregated over all 82 occupations and averages over the period 1980-1995. Table entries are 
shares of the education group characteristics with respect to total shares (that is they add up to 100 % 
horizontally). Entries in parentheses are shares of the respective flows with respect to the respective 
educational group (that is they add up to 100 % vertically). Therefore, the share of a given flow of a given 
educational group with respect to total hirings can be calculated by multiplying the entry with the share of 








































































2  0.405 0.783 0.528 0.409 0.701 0.499 
Observations  1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 1311 














Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Group definitions are as follows: Members of Group 1(low education) have neither finished high 
school ($ELWXU) nor an apprenticeship successfully. Group 2 (intermediate education) members have either finished high school ($ELWXU) 
or an apprenticeship or both successfully. Members of Group 3 (high education) hold a degree from a university or an applied university 
()DFKKRFKVFKXOH). 


















Log unemployed:   0.612*  (0.044)   0.450*  (0.030)  0.452*  (0.043) 
Log registered vacancies:   0.468*  (0.042)   0.431*  (0.024)  0.414*  (0.037) 
Linear time trend     - 0.063* 
 
(0.009)     - 0.021*  (0.004)        (0.007) 
Group 1 (primary/agricultural)  	 (0.270)     - 0.270*  (0.102)     	
 (0.125) 
Group 2 (industry/manufacturing)       0.746*  (0.067)     - 0.138*  (0.030)     - 0.729*  (0.051) 
Group 3 (crafts)    0.441*  (0.038)       0.212*  (0.028)     - 0.259*  (0.053) 
Group 4 (technical occupations)     - 2.837*  (0.317)     - 0.525*  (0.152)       0.856*  (0.111) 
Group 5 (services)     - 0.426*  (0.121)     	 (0.058)       0.501*  (0.079) 
Group 6 (white collar/clerical)     - 0.707*  (0.156)       0.907*  (0.043)    1.159*  (0.087) 
Group 7 (social and cultural)     - 1.280*  (0.214)     	
  (0.096)       1.371*  (0.072) 
Group 8 (health)     - 0.488  (0.236)       (0.112)       0.505  (0.214) 
Group 9 (low skilled)       0.369  (0.101) 
 
   - 0.293*  (0.085)       0.258*  (0.083) 
R
2 0.581  0.784  0.653 
Observations 1311  1311  1311 
H0: constant returns to scale  F(1,1299) =   F(1,1299) = 35.70** F(1,1299) = 16.01** 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients without asterisk are significant at the 5%-level. Italics indicate that the null 
that the coefficient is zero cannot be rejected at the 5%-level. For a detailed description of the definition of occupational groups, 
refer to the data appendix. Coefficients and standard errors are obtained using a 2-step procedure following Haisken-DeNew and 
Schmidt (1997). The first step provides robust OLS-results with group 1 as reference group. On the second step, dummy 
coefficients are renormalized as deviations weighted by group-size from a group-size weighted mean (where group size refers to the 
number of occupations contained in a group) and standard errors are adjusted accordingly. The procedure therefore renders the 
results independent from the choice of the reference group. 
* Significant at the 1%-level.  



















Log unemployed:   0.671*  (0.048)   0.490*  (0.033)  0.456*  (0.050) 
Log registered vacancies:   0.483*  (0.042)   0.440*  (0.027)  0.454*  (0.044) 
Linear time trend     - 0.066* 
 
(0.009)     - 0.026*  (0.006)        (0.008) 
Group 1 (primary/agricultural)  	 (0.280)       	 (0.158)     - (0.161) 
Group 2 (industry/manufacturing)       0.746*  (0.070)     - 0.136*  (0.036)     - 0.758*  (0.059) 
Group 3 (crafts)    0.510*  (0.040)       0.258*  (0.030)     - 0.251*  (0.064) 
Group 4 (technical occupations)     - 2.879*  (0.330)     - 0.717*  (0.173)       0.731*  (0.106) 
Group 5 (services)     - 0.505*  (0.128)     	
 (0.056)       0.563*  (0.086) 
Group 6 (white collar/clerical)     - 0.954*  (0.187)       0.705*  (0.050)    1.018*  (0.093) 
Group 7 (social and cultural)     - 1.137*  (0.217)     	 (0.104)       1.522*  (0.083) 
Group 8 (health)  	
 (0.231)       
 (0.099)       0.495  (0.208) 
Group 9 (low skilled)       0.253  (0.119) 
 
   - 0.311*  (0.082)       0.366*  (0.082) 
R
2 0.573  0.732  0.610 
Observations 1311  1311  1311 
H0: constant returns to scale  F(1,1299) = 10.72** F(1,1299) = 7.60**  F(1,1299) = 6.46** 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients without asterisk are significant at the 5%-level. Italics indicate that the null 
that the coefficient is zero cannot be rejected at the 5%-level. For a detailed description of the definition of occupational groups, 
refer to the data appendix. Coefficients and standard errors are obtained using a 2-step procedure following Haisken-DeNew and 
Schmidt (1997). The first step provides robust OLS-results with group 1 as reference group. On the second step, dummy 
coefficients are renormalized as deviations weighted by group-size from a group-size weighted mean (where group size refers to the 
number of occupations contained in a group) and standard errors are adjusted accordingly. The procedure therefore renders the 
results independent from the choice of the reference group. 
* Significant at the 1%-level.  

























W ￿ ￿ O H Y H O
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Group 6
Group 7
Group 8
Group 9
4
8